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* 





Auctions play an important role in economics. In their most basic form, they are one of 
the ways in which various commodities, financial assets  and concession rights are 
allocated to individuals and firms, particularly in a market-oriented setting. An auction is 
a market institution with an explicit set of rules determining resource allocation and prices 
on the basis of bids from the market participants. Since some products such as spectrum 
concessions  have no standard value, auctions provide one way approaching the question 
of price formation of these products. 
 
This paper explores the details of  Turkish GSM 1800 MHz auction held in April, 2000 
within auction theory and competition policies framework. According to the findings of 
this study, since the auction design inappropriately dealt with market conditions, Is-Tim, 
winning bidders of one of two spectrums on offer, was able to make a high bid by 
deriving the price of first license, the reserve price of second one, up to excessive level, so 
other bidders were not able to afford  to bid over this price  at second round. First finding 
of this study is that Is-Tim is either predatory pricer or winner’s curse both of which 
undermines general economic efficiency. As a result by not selling second license, 
Turkish GSM market has been unnecessarily concentrated;  Turkish Treasury has 
obtained less revenue than it would; and the liability of  TT owner of third license at the 
extremely high winning price of the first license,  has soared more than what it otherwise 
would be  by  possibly undermining the market value of TT. 
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The essence of ultimate decision remains impenetrable to the observer 
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–often, indeed, to the decider himself..... There will always be the dark 
and tangled stretches in the decision-making process- mysterious even 
to those who may be most intimately involved. 
John Fitzgerald Kennedy 
 
I have come across men of letters who have written history without 
taking part in public affairs, and politicians who have concerned 
themselves  with producing events without thinking about them. I 
have observed that the first are always inclined  to find general causes, 
whereas the second, living in the midst of disconnected daily facts, are 
prone to imagine that everything is attributable to particular incidents, 
DQG WKDW ZLUHV WKH\ S￿OO DUH WKH VDPH DV WKRVH WKH PRYH WKH ZRUOG￿ ,W LV
to be presumed  that both are equally deceived. 
Alexis de Tocqueville 

1.  Introduction 
 
In recent years, many governments around the world have been trying to attract 
private capital and firms to manage infrastructure services such as energy, transportation and 
telecommunications.   Governments have liberalized these markets by either directly selling 
public properties or awarding concessions
1  and then introducing competition polices. 
However, both directly selling public assets and awarding concessions to private firms in the 
provision of infrastructure services have long been a controversial issue. During the last 
decade, focus of the debate has shifted from whether or not to award to how to do it best.  
 
Some have argued that awarding a concession is a procedure, not much different from 
one used, say, in equipment procurement. For them, auction rules used for standard 
procurement operations are equally applicable in awarding concession cases. For others, 
however, French type of concession awarding process or so called beauty contest, where  the 
conceding authority has a broad range of discretionary power, is the best way to go about it,  
since concession contracts involve quite relation-specific investments, and the development of 
                                                            
1 In the paper, concession will be called as the transfer of  property rights of governments for limited time. In the 
economics literature, the word "franchise"  tends to be used for the concept(for detail discussion on 
characteristics of concession, see Emek, 2000  and Klein 1996).      4 
effective long-term contractual  relationships between parties. In such situations, the argument 
goes, the conceding authority needs such a discretionary power both to make appropriate 
adjustment to the contracts as the need arises due to changes in conditions that cannot easily 
be foreseen and assessed beforehand, and to curb opportunistic behaviors on the part of 
private contractors. Auction theory, by and large, appears to support the former view. It 
maintains that the conceding authority is likely get best possible deals from firms through 
setting up clear bidding rules instead of negotiating.  
 
 
What really matters in awarding a concession is to calculate the value of it, because it 
has no standard market valuation.  Since information is very important in calculating market 
value of concession and the computations employed therein are very complex, it is suggested 
that it is in the best interest of the seller to devote resources to expanding market through 
auctions rather than to collecting information for making complex calculations required to 
figure out the best mechanism.  
 
On the other hand, the expected return from an efficient auction for awarding 
concessions  is not only revenue maximization but also optimal uses of national resources, 
efficient market configuration, and  effective competition in providing  infrastructure services. 
The auction mechanism used in awarding concessions for  spectrum rights provides the 
competition for  market and produces an impact on market structure. Thus, the competition 
policies such as collusion, predatory pricing and winner's curse are deeply supposed to be 
taken into consideration in auction designing. 
 
First GSM concessions (900 MHz) in Turkey were awarded to Telsim and Turkcell in 
1993.  Second step in GSM concessions  (1800 MHz) has been taken  in April 2000 by using 
a sequential  first-priced sealed bid auction to award three concession contracts. In the end, 
the government has only been able to award two of three concessions one of which has gone   5 
to Is Bankasi-Telecom Italia consortium (Is-Tim). The other one has been awarded to Turk 
Telekom (TT) at winning price of first license.  
 
In this study, main features of this auction will  be explored by using auction theory 
and competition policies framework. According to the findings of this study, since the auction 
design inappropriately dealt with market conditions, Is-Tim, winning bidders of one of two 
spectrums on offer, was able to make a high bid by deriving the price of first license, the 
reserve price of second one, up to excessive level, so other bidders were not able to afford  to 
bid over this price  at second round. As a result by not selling second license, Turkish GSM 
market has been unnecessarily concentrated;  Turkish Treasury has obtained less revenue than 
it would; and the liability of  TT owner of third license at the extremely high winning price of 
the first license, has soared more than what it otherwise would be  by possibly undermining 
the market value of TT.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section two discusses the 
advantages and disadvantages of both negotiation and auction mechanisms. The third section 
deals with auction formats and characteristics. Then, competition policies in auction theory 
will be analyzed in the fourth section. In the fifth and sixth sections, respectively, 
developments in Turkish cellular markets and specifications of GSM 1800 MHz license 
auction will be reviewed.  In the seventh section, the outcomes of the auction will be 
discussed in terms of both theoretical dimension and empirical findings.  The paper concludes 
with a set of suggestions for policy and research regarding efficient auction designs for 3G 
license concession.  
           
2. Auctions versus Beauty Contest, or Negotiation  
 
Beauty Contest in the cellular phone markets, generally speaking, refers to an award 
system where the award is made based on the judges opinion of the bidders planned services, 
prices and rollout speed. Put it this way, the winners of the spectrum concessions will be   6 
chosen by beauty contest according to who would guarantee the lowest cost to consumers, 
invest the most in infrastructure, stimulate creativity, and so on. In other words, the exact 
details of so called beauty contest will differ in each case and country. Main feature of this 
method in awarding spectrum concessions is to provide the conceding authority with an   
extensive discretion to negotiate with bidders and make appropriate adjustments in concession 
contract in the name of social welfare. On the other hand,  the main opposition arising from 
this side against auction mechanism  is that the auction mechanism to award spectrum 
concession  could give an unnecessarily high bid prices and the cost of spectrum concessions 
will be passed on to consumers from operators in the form of higher prices.   
 
A key point of beauty contest is to improve the bargaining power of the conceding 
authority to obtain any efficient outcome. However, by setting up clear, fair, competitive,  and 
credible bidding rules instead of negotiating, the conceding authority could get the most 
optimal deals from firms, in terms of not only the government revenue but also social welfare. 
The auction theory
2 and country practices, by and large support this view. As noted in 
Table:1, 21 countries have chosen the auction mechanisms, and while 14 countries have 
preferred employing  beauty contest to award third-generation (3G) licenses.  
 
Klemperer (2000b, and 2000c) reports that "while the exact details of the auction's 
design will be crucial to its success,  choosing an auction over beauty contest to allocate 
mobile services will give better outcome". Firstly, a well-designed auction is the most likely 
method of allocating resources to those who can use them most valuably. Secondly, even if 
governments had access to good information to allocate spectrum concessions to very right 
firms under optimal conditions, allocation by bureaucrats leads the perception -if not the 
reality- of favoritism and corruption. Thirdly, an auction can raise sums of money  valued 
under market conditions to support public finance. A beauty contest, by contrast, can give 
away valuable assets at a fraction of what they are worth.   Fourthly, like any other companies 
                                                            
2 See, Bulow, and Klemperer, 1996; Klemperer, 2000b; Milgrom, 1989. Especially, Bulow, and Klemperer 
(1996) demonstrates the advantages of auctions over negotiations in terms of the efficient outcomes.     7 
telecom companies will charge the prices that maximizes profits, independent from what 
spectrum cost them in the past. So,  there is no absolute validity of that firm's costs in the 
auction will be passed to consumers through in the form of higher prices. Finally,  how can a 
concessionaire guarantee the lowest price to consumers during in the face of uncertainty of 
long-future in especially developing countries that have long had an economy with a high 
inflationary and unstable macro economic environment.     
 
Klemperer (2001) reports that "efficiency was the main concern of the UK 
government for selling 3G licenses".  Government's stated objectives were to: 
 
(a) utilize the available UMTS spectrum with optimum efficiency;  
 
(b) promote effective and sustainable competition for the provision of  mobile phone 
services;  
 
(c) and subject to the above objectives, design an auction which is best judged to 




Competition should be provided by both attracting more bidders and not allowing cell-
phone market to be unnecessarily concentrated. Auction should be held via simple 
understandable, non-discriminatory and transparent rules to address former aim. To achieve 
second aim,   no bidder should be permitted to hold more than one license and available all 
spectrum licenses should be utilized. 
 
Efficiency should be understood that licenses will go to the hands of bidder with best 
business plans. Since a bidder with a better business plan will generally value a license more, 
                                                            
3 So, the auction employed by UK government has ever generated the biggest revenue (600 Euros per capita) 
around Europe by selling 3G  licenses.   8 
this aim roughly reduces to seeking to maximize the sum of the valuations of the bidders who 
are awarded licenses. Thus, government will earn more revenue as a result of efficient auction 
outcome.  
 
3. Types of Auctions  
 
As an allocative mechanism of single unit objects, four basic types of auction are used 
(Figure:1): ascending-bid auction (also called open, oral, or English Auction), descending-bid 
auction (also called Dutch auction), the first-price sealed-bid auction  (also called 
discriminatory auction in multiple units), and the second-price sealed-bid auction (also called 
Vickrey auction, and uniform-price auction in multiple units). 
 
As shown in Table:2, price is successively raised until only one bidder remains in the 
ascending-bid auction, and that bidder wins the object at the final price. In ascending bid 
auction bidders are able to reassess bids according to new information arising from other 
declared bids during the bidding process.  
 
As oppose to the ascending-bid auction, in descending bid-auction, the auction stars at 
a very high and then price is continuously lowered until only one bidder remains, and that 
bidder wins the object at the final price. 
 
 In the first-price sealed-bid auction, each bidder independently submits their own bid, 
and winning bidder pays his or her own bid. In both descending and first-price sealed bid 
auctions, bidders do not have a chance to access to new information to reassess bids during 
bidding process, because they can learn other bids at very last moment which is too late to 
reassess bids. 
   9 
 In the second-price sealed-bid auction, each bidder independently submits their own 
bid, and winning bidder pays next highest bid. The main aim of this method is to encourage 
bidders to bid high  by not taking others' evaluations  into account in common value auctions. 
 
Auction types above almost focus on the sale of a single indivisible unit. In recent 
years, auction literature pay attention to the sale of multiple units, such as treasury bills and  
spectrum rights (Ausubel, 1999; Back and Zender, 1993; Klemperer, 1999; McMillan, 1994; 
Milgrom, 1998). 
 
In a simultaneous auction, each bidder offers a schedule specifying for each possible 
fraction of the item.   After bids are taken and sorted from high to low,  auctioned items are 
awarded at the highest bid prices until supply is exhausted.  
 
Sequential auctions, are generally employed when no buyer is interested in or allowed 
to  more than one unit. Each part of homogeneous units is sequentially auctioned, and the 
winning price of first unit  becomes a base (reserve price)  for next round. 
 
4. Competition Policies in Auction Design  
 
   Following the analysis provided by Klemperer (2001) and within the aim of this 
study,  competition policies oriented pitfalls in auction design can be collected under four 
headings among other things. 
 
a)  Collusion, 
b)  Entry deterrence, 
c)  Predatory pricing. 
d)  Winner's Curse 
 
   10 
4.1. Collusion 
 
Ascending and the second-price sealed bid auctions are more vulnerable than 
descending and  the first-price sealed bid auction to collusion, especially "tacit" collusion
4, 
because a cartel can easily punish  the member breaking co-operation agreement in former 
group auction than in later group (Cramton, and  Schwartz, 2000; Graham, and Marshall, 
1987; Klemperer, 1999, and 2001; Milgrom, 1989). 
 
Collusion agreement can be made both explicitly and implicitly. While explicit 
collusion agreements put restriction on the number of rivals, under implicit agreement the 
restriction is put on the price during auction process. In ascending auction, since bids made by 
rivals are observable to others, and bidding is a continuous process,  if  a cartel member 
exceeds pre-determined low collusion price, other members of cartel in response to this action 
can increase their bids as well. As a result, in ascending auctions the cartel members do not 
have incentive to break up co-operation agreement, since s/he does not benefit from this 
behavior.      
 
By the same token, in second-price bid auction, since the owner of highest evaluation 
already submits her or his own bid and pays next highest bid, breaking cartel agreement and 
going beyond pre-determined low cartel price are not beneficial  to any cartel member.    
 
By contrast to former group auctions, in  descending and first-price sealed bid 
auctions, since every bidder submits her or his final and best bid and can learn  rival bids only 
at very last moment, they do not have a device to punish co-operation breaking member. 
 
 
                                                            
4 Explicit collusion is also a big concern in terms of the efficiency of auction. However, as Klemperer  (2001) 
and OECD (1999) argue it should be a greater concern for the  Competition Authorities to investigate under 
existing law.   11 
4.2. Entry Deterrence 
  
Klemperer (2001) argues that "as an auction with too few bidders will be both 
unprofitable for the auctioneer, and potentially inefficient, the major concern of an auction 
designer  should be to attract more bidders to auction". Ascending auctions are often 
particularly poor in this respect as well.  
 
  It could strongly presumed that a bidder which values the winning the most will be 
eventual winner, because even if it is outbid at an early stage it can and will eventually top 
any opposition. This strong presumption causes some bidder to deter the entry, or depress the 
bidding of rivals. Although  an advantaged bidder will most probably win a sealed-bid 
auction, the outcome is less certain than in ascending auction because each bidder must make 
a single "best and final" offer in the face of uncertainty about its rivals' bid. So, since weaker 
firms have at least some chance of victory in a sealed-bid auction and potential entrants will 
likely be more willing to enter it than ascending auction  (Klemperer, 2001).  
 
4.3.  Predatory Pricing 
  
Predatory pricing is a deliberate strategy, usually by a dominant firm, of driving 
competitiors out of the market by setting very low prices or selling below the firm's 
incremental costs of producing the output (often equated for practical purposes with average 
variable costs). Once the predator has successfully driven out competitors and deterred entry 
of new firms, it can raise prices and earn higher prices. 
 
  McMillan (1994) argues that "a bidder may try to derive prices for the early items up 
to excessive levels so the winners will be unable to afford to compete for the later items" in 
sequential auctions with homogenous multiple items being auctioned. Since simultaneous 
auctions allocate multiple items at the price offered by each winning bidder, no bidder does 
have incentive to raise her or his bid excessively high.   12 
4.4. Winner's Curse 
 
When the item being bid for has a common value the phenomenon dramatically 
named the winner's curse can arise (Klemperer, 1999; McAfee, and McMillan, 1987). 
Winner's curse in auctions occurs, when the winning bidder's estimation and bid go too much  
beyond the market consensus on the value of auctioned item.  That's why, in many auctions, 
other rivals' perceptions about the auctioned item are quite informative to others.  
 
  If all bidders share the same information about the auctioned item, they would equally 
value it. The more a bidder's information about the item differentiates from other's, the more 
her or his estimation about item value will deviate. For this reason, bidders would like to 
protect themselves by bidding  conservatively and prudently.   
 
  Since, bidders can observe others' valuation in ascending auctions and can not in 
sealed-bid auction, buyers may find it prudent to stay with, or  exit an ascending price auction 
at more or less than their pre-auction estimate of value (Klemperer, 1999). However, the same 
opportunity is not valid in sealed-price auctions. Milgrom, and Weber (1982) demonstrates 
that expected revenue from auction is more in ascending and second-price auction, 
respectively than in sealed bid auction.     
 
4. 5. Protecting Competition While Designing Auctions 
 
  The issues above are the pitfalls arising from auction design in the context of  auction 
format. However an auction designer could deal with the aforementioned problems via 
different devices. 
 
  The main reason of using auction mechanism to sell an asset is information 
asymmetries about the value of asset being considered to sell, on one hand between seller and  
rivals; on the other hand between rivals.    13 
When a seller is skeptical about the collusion between bidders, it can put a reasonably 
high reserve price to push bids up. However, unreasonably determined high reserve price will 
not attract new entrants willing to join the auction.   
 
As mentioned above, attracting more bidders to auction  will increase competition. 
McAfee, and McMillan  (1987) argue that "increasing the number of bidders, so competition,  
increases the revenue of the seller on the average". 
 
In addition to increasing competition, Mcmillan (1994) argues that "the government 
can increase its revenue by publicizing any available information that affects the licenses' 
assessed value: providing assurances about future regulatory developments, or announcing 
how much new spectrum will be allocated to telecommunications in the future". 
 
  5. The Developments in Turkish Cellular Phone Market  
 
  5.1. Initial Stage 
 
  In May 1993, TT awarded two 15-year contracts -not licenses- to build and operate 
cellular network based on the Europen GSM standard.  Turkcell, a private-sector consortium 
including Telecom Finland, Turkey's Cukurova Holding, and Ericsson; and Telsim led by the 
Rumeli group, were chosen after an international tender. The contracts were built on a 
compound of revenue-sharing and build-operate-transfer (BOT) models. According to the 
initial  agreements, the two consortia would be permitted to buy outright licenses for  US$ 
500 million at each in April 1998. Turkcell and Telsim were granted 25-year licenses as a 
result of their capital investment, but were required to pay US$ 500 million each as a license  
fee to the Treasury.
5 
 
  5.2. Later stage 
                                                            
5 For initial stage developments, mainly benefited from MEC, 2001.    14 
 
  In April 2000 third national GSM license was awarded to Is-Tim for staggering US$ 
2.525 billion plus 17 per cent in value added tax (VAT) for a total price tag of US$ 2.954  
billion.   The high price Is-Tim offered caught many market players -as well as  government- 
by surprise
6, especially given the huge gap between its bid and next higher offer of  US$ 
1.350 billion (see Table:3).   
  
  Four bidders in the second tender withdrew all from the field dramatically. Comparing 
the GSM license price per head of population per MHz in several emerging markets in recent 
years implies that Is-Tim got one of the most expensive mobile licenses purchased to date 
(see Figure:2). 
 
  Mr. Ersin Ozince, CEO of Is Bankasi, responded the criticisms of that  the price is 
quite high by saying "we did good job and are still behind our bid and it is going to be a 
success story". Mr. Enis Oksuz, the Minister of Transportation, by supporting Mr. Ozince's 
remark, said that "it is a world record and those who strategically think will eventually win" 
(Hurriyet, 4/14/2000).     
 
  While Mr. Ozince and Mr. Oksuz are characterizing the outcome of the auction as a 
success story, some including Klemperer (2001) have argued it was a failure rather than a 
success.  Is-Tim made a bid far more for the first license than it could possibly worth if  it  
had to compete with a rival holding the second license. Moreover, MEC (2001) “argues that 
the initial costs of network deployment, which could run as high as  US$ 2 billion, along with 
the realities of a slowing rate of subscriber expansion and stiff competition from well-
entrenched incumbents cast doubts over whether Is-Tim paid a reasonable price for the 
license”.    
                                                            
6 For example, the headlines of Turkey's leading newspapers were put  such as "Shock Price" (Sabah, 4/13/2000; 
and "Record Price" (Hürriyet, 4/15/200).    15 
  In the remainder of the study, the characteristics of the Turkish GSM 1800 MHz 
auction will be analyzed in the light of both the features of Turkish cellular market and 
auction theory and competition polices.  
 
6. Specifications  of the GSM Auction 
 
  The basic specifications of  the auction held on April 3,  2000 were as follows: 
 
•  Two GSM 1800 MHz licenses were to be auctioned. 
 
•  The conceding  authority was the Ministry of  Transportation.  
 
•  Incumbent operators  were not allowed to enter the auction. 
 
•  The auction method was a first-price sealed bid auction which was to be 
sequentially held. 
 
•  Depending  on the discretion of the conceding authority, after opening bids taken 
from the bidders, the owner of the highest bid and next highest bid might be 
invited to a competitive negotiation. 
 
•  After completing the first round of the sequential action, the rest of bidders were 
going to bid in a first-price sealed bid auction with a reserve price at the winning 
price of the first license. 
 
•  One GSM 1800 license was to be awarded to TT (state owned telecom monopoly) 
at the winning price of  first license. 
   16 
Moreover,  the most importantly the auction was held seven years after two GSM 900 
MHz had been awarded and in the face of the uncertainty of when, how and how many  3G 
license (s) would be awarded. We will come back to these issues while analyzing the outcome 
of the auction. For that time,  one was able to argue that, after signing a three year stand-by 
agreement leading to restructuring the economy, Turkish markets were going to  be more 
stable and predictable so that an investor would be likely to aggressively bid  for a GSM 1800 




Since incumbent operators  were not allowed to enter the auction, and there was 
seemingly no advantaged firm between bidders, the auction attracted sufficiently enough 
bidders -five bidders for two licenses. So, it can be said that, within competition framework 
analyzed above, there was no entry deterrence problem. On the other had, since the auction 
was first-price sealed-bid one, the tacit collusion concern which is effectively enforced in 
ascending and second-price sealed bid auctions seems to have been  mitigated. However, 
predatory pricing and winner's curse issues still await to be answered.    
 
  7. Is the Outcome of the Auction Really Efficient?   
  
  As mentioned above, after first round Is-Tim made a staggering bid, the rest of bidders 
did not show up to bid for second license. As reported above, the outcome has had even 
interested persons' mind confused and itself a puzzle for many. As reported by Klemperer 
(2001), efficiency oriented awarding (auction) policies can be summarized under three 
headings. 
 
a)  realizing the  full economic value to consumers, industry and the taxpayer of the 
spectrum, 
                                                            
7 As a matter of  fact, after collapsing IMF backed  Turkish economic program in February 2001,  unfortunately 
pessimists, not optimists about the future developments of Turkish economy have won.   17 
b)   utilizing the available spectrums with optimum efficiency, 
 
c)    promoting effective and sustainable competition for the provision of  mobile 
phone services. 
 
Under this taxonomy, Turkish GSM 1800 MHz license auction does not seem to result 
in an efficient outcome, because mobile phone market is unnecessarily concentrated  because 
off not selling the second license. If the license fee was unnecessarily overvalued because of 
the auction  design, we'll show the answer is likely yes,  TT to be privatized was given 
liability more than it would be which could undermine its market value. Moreover, if selling 
two licenses would result in higher prices than selling one, the taxpayer of the spectrum 
would have benefited more. Put it this way, if this argument is  correct, we'll show the answer 
is likely yes, overall welfare effect of Turkish  GSM 1800 MHz license auction is negative. 
It’s been not easy to argue at least  the outcome of said auction is positive in terms of 
efficiency concern. 
 
7.1. Is the license Fee Really High? 
 
  First of all, as seen in Figure:2, the winning bid made by Is-Tim is really high as 
compared to some other emerging markets. Is-Tim's bid (US$2.70 per pop per MHz) in 
Turkey,  a lower-middle-income country according to World Bank statistics, much  higher 
than those in Mexico (US$0,20); Argentina  (US$0,25); and; Hungary  (US$ 2,40) which are 
upper-middle-income countries within the same concept above, and more than even the bid 
made by incumbent operators, Turkcell and Telsim (US$0,25). Given the fact that Is-Tim's 
bid relatively high, is it worth bidding high for a GSM 1800 licenses in Turkey? To be able to 
answer this let's look at some features of Turkey mobile phone markets. 
 
Turkey's cellular phone market seemingly expands fast (Figure:3).However, this 
figures should cautiously be assessed.  Firstly, the rate of subscriber expansion is to slow   18 
during the coming years. Secondly, this figures seem very optimistic and show that in year 
2005, 88 per cent (40 million) of Turkish population  (45 million) between age 14 and 65   is 
going to have a cell-phone. When we look at GDP per capita (PPP)  in Figure:4, Turkey with 
US$ 6.300 GDP per capita (PPP) is the poorest country within OECD members. With this 
welfare level among other things, it would be  pretty optimistic view to expect the same 
developments in terms of consumer base expansion experienced by other OECD countries. 
Even if the figures relating to Turkish cellular market growth in Figure:3  are assumed as 
realistic, Figure:5 shows another aspect of telecom story.   According to these figures, Turkish 
people do or can not seemingly pay  for phone-calls as much as other OECD member country 
citizens do. Turkey's per capita public telecommunication revenue (fixed+mobile) is the 
lowest one (US$143)  within OECD countries
8 (Figure:5).  Moreover, more truth-telling story 
comes from Figure:6. Not surprisingly, Turkish subscribers do or can not pay much for 
mobile phone bills either.
9  
 
On the other hand, it can be reasonably argued, the increasing competition with new 
entrants into market prices, will cause some decline in cellular phone bills, so the revenue of 
cellular phone companies because of lower calling prices.    
 
As a result of these figures, at least one certain finding can be argued that  no easy 
money awaits in Turkish cell markets for one to invest aggressively much in sunk costs such 




7.2. The Intuition Behind Is-Tim's Strategy! 
                                                            
8 Of course these figures do not demonstrate price differences across countries. 
9 In fact in these figures Telsim, one of two incumbent operator with 30  per cent market share in 1999, was not 
included. Even if we linearly increase the revenue of per subscriber by 30 per cent to US$ 290,  by thinking   19 
 
At this stage, the question of why Is-Tim made a high bid is in need of being 
answered. Whether is Is-Tim winner's curse in the context of auction theory or predatory 
pricer in the context of competition policies?   
 
Before going further, one more thing is certainly raised or concluded from even this 
question. Did Is-Tim gamble? Corporate governance theory dictates that in developing 
countries with weak bankruptcy  policies
10 and too big to fail doctrine, which is an implicit 
guarantee scheme provided by government's to those firms facing a bankruptcy risk
11,  firms 
could easily take an  excessive risk by creating moral hazard. Within this framework, Is-Tim's 
bidding strategy seems to go along with what corporate governance theory argues.
12  
    
  By accepting at least that Is-Tim has had a risk taker strategy
13, we should turn to 
aforementioned questions: why did it do so?  Table:3 shows all bids made in the auction. 
However, before starting the analyze of  the figures, we should  firstly note that no one had 
known before auction, when, how and how many 3G licenses would be awarded. These 
uncertain future developments make bidders conservative to bid less than what they would 
according to auction theory. 
 
Secondly,  according to specifications of auction as mentioned above, the conceding 
authority had great discretion to invite the owner of the highest bid and next highest bid  to an 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
simply to ease analysis,   it is going to be just over  that of Iceland (US$ 267) and that of Portugal (US $ 275) the 
statue of Turkey in ranks will not dramatically change. 
10 See Atiyas, 1996. 
11 See Joon-Ho,  and Mishkin, 2000; Mishkin, 2001. 
12 It will indeed be more transparent, if Is-Tim cries and lobbies by complaining it had invested too much  in 
sunk cost, before the allocation of 3G licenses. 
13 Indeed, bidding high in auctions dictates in auction theory that high bidding bidder is risk averse, since failing 
in an auction means loosing some positive profit. I use the term risk taker herein  to explain risks in cell-phone 
market rather than in auction market of awarding GSM 1800 MHz licenses.   20 
ascending auction after opening bids taken from the bidders. According to auction theory
14, 
this type of rules make bidders anxious to disclosure their true evaluation about the auctioned 
object during first round, because of lack of commitment of the auctioneer (put it this way 
because of more discretion of the auctioneer). 
 
Thirdly, the conceding authority put insufficiently low reserve price (US$ 600 million) 
which somehow shows the auctioneer's valuation about the auctioned object; and  this reserve 
price was corrected and supported government budget revenue estimation (US$ 523 million)  
in 2000 Public Budget.  
 
These three points (i.e. uncertainty about future developments in the cellular phone 
market, great discretion of auctioneer, and low reserve price), possibly made bidders 
conservative. Hence, it could be assumed that bidders excluding Is-Tim were most likely to be 
able raise their bids but not more than the highest bid by Is-Tim. The figures in Table:3  
should be assessed along with these findings.   
 
As seen in Table:3, without Is-Tim, the mean bid  of remaining bidders is around US$ 
1,2 billion and second highest bid is US$ 1,350 billion. Other than second highest bid, we still 
have two bids above the mean of bids of those excluding Is-Tim.  According to market 
consensus resulting from the auction, it could be said that even if Is-Tim withdrew from an 
hypothetical ascending auction, at least two bidders were willing to purchase two licenses at 
second (US$1,350 billion) and third highest (US$1,224 billion) price the sum of which   
(US$2,574 billion) is still higher than that of Is-Tim (US$2,525 billion). One can argue that 
after overcoming the aforementioned obstacles and using an simultaneous ascending auction 
with a sufficient reserve price, second and third highest bids could have been pushed up. Of 
course, if Is-Tim had been sincere with its strategy,  the bids could have been gone up more 
but still not than Is-Tim's original bid. 
 
                                                            
14 See, McAfee, and McMillan, 1987.   21 
Having said that we have still two eager bidders willing to get two license, the 
intuition of  Is-Tim's strategy and bid could be explained as follows: without Is-Tim, market 
valuation  of two licenses is around US$ 2,4 million and slightly less than that of Is-Tim. As 
argued by McMillan (1994), Is-Tim seemingly derived price for first license up to excessive 
level so the others would be unable to afford to compete for second license in sequential 
auction. Even if Is-Tim is not predatory pricer, it is supposed to be winner's curse given the 
fact that it paid too much in the light of the findings above.  
 
GSM 1800 MHz operators have arrived much later in market than their GSM 900 
MHz rivals, Turkcell and Telsim who have already signed up the "best" customers; and they 
must invest more heavily in their networks than their incumbent rivals. So, GSM 1800 MHz 
operators in Turkey have already had disadvantages as compared to incumbent operators. If 
three licenses had been sold out, there would have been three succeeded GSM 1800 MHz 
operators plus two incumbent operators; so, five players  in the market; and  stiffer 
competition than in a market with  four players. Given the fact that no new entrant would like 
to compete aggressively in the market, predatory pricing to deter rivals' entrance into market 
during competition for market (i.e, auction) will benefit remaining market players.  
 
Although, four operators in the market will equally  benefit from getting one potential 
rival out of market, only Is-Tim had a means of doing this as an active bidder. As mentioned 
above,   other market players TT, Turkcell and Telsim were not an active participant of the 
auction.  
 
It should most importantly be stressed, although no one other than Is-Tim's bid 
preparing team can know insight of the real bidding strategy
15, the intuition behind Is-Tim's 
                                                            
15 If IS-Tim consortia will demand supportive arrangements for itself in 3G licenses auction process, since it’s 
had a great financial burden because of high GSM 1800 MHz license fee payment in April 2000 auction, the 
argument of this study will be corrected.  Otherwise, we will still need to seek appropriate values of selling of 
spectrum rights in Turkey.   22 
bid  is supposed to be one of two evils predatory pricing and winner's curse both of which 
undermine total social welfare, according to analysis provided above. 
 
In conclusion if an ascending price auction (possibly backed by a sealed bid 
component
16 at later stage to discourage collusion and encourage new entrants) was held by 
the conceding authority, the outcome was going to be better in terms of efficiency.  Put it this 
way, 
(a) public revenue from selling spectrum would be more than what it is;  
 
(b)  one more license would be sold and market concentration would be less than 
what it is; and  
 
(c)  TT would have less liability than what it has.   
 
  8. Conclusions and  Lessons for Awarding Mechanism of  3G Licenses  
 
  As mentioned above the auctioning authority was the Ministry of Transportation. As 
indicated by Klemperer (2000b and 2000c) the one of main reasons of why the auction is 
chosen over beauty contest is the fear of  allegations of favoritism and  corruption. Indeed, 
right after auction outcomes had appeared,  Mr. Oksuz, the Minister of Transportation  said 
that "our honest auction argument has been corrected, and no one can accuse us of favoritism 
and corruption" (Hurriyet, 4/14/2000). What this statement shows is Mr. Oksuz's reasonable 
anxiety against potential allegation of  favoritism and corruption. What else from this 
statement could be  derived? Politicians in developing countries are under pressure while 
allocating public assets. That's why their main concern  is the explanatory power of any 
outcome resulting from an awarding process rather than the correct market value of awarded 
asset.  
                                                            
16 Called as Anglo-Dutch Auction by Klemperer (2001)  which is a combination of ascending and sealed bid 
auction.   23 
 
  What we can derive from this analysis is, if Anglo-Dutch Auction proposed by 
Klemperer (2001) instead of a sequential auction had been held, and two operators   had been 
awarded  at different prices (may be, the gap between the prices would be huge at sealed bid 
stage), Minister as a vote-maximization politician would have been likely to have a hard time 
to explain why winning prices are so  different from each other. That's why, as argued by 
Joskow (1998),  commercial public assets in infrastructure sectors should be managed by 
independent, expert, transparent and accountable regulators.   
 
  Second lesson from Turkish GSM 1800 MHz license auction is that, the conceding 
authority should  publicize any available information that affects the licenses' assessed value: 
providing assurances about future regulatory developments, or announcing how much new 
spectrum will be allocated to telecommunications in the future. No one still
17 knows about 
when, how and how many 3G license(s) will be awarded, and what  the future structure of  TT 
state owned monopoly and the owner of a GSM 1800 MHz license is going to be. In this 
regard, 3G related polices  should be made clear and public as soon as possible. To lower 
market concentration, which has unnecessarily been increased as a result of the GSM 1800 
MHz auction, and promote competition in 3G auctions, as done in many countries (see 
Table:1) the number of licenses to be auctioned should be assigned more (at least five) than 
the number of incumbent operators (four).       
 
Thirdly, the conceding authority should assess well what, when and to whom it sells. 
After collecting and analyzing  the information dealing with these concerns, the conceding 
authority should determine correct auction format and put a reasonable reserve price. On the 
other hand, new regulator, The Telecommunication Authority should make the future 
regulatory rules clear and  publicize them. 
Finally, and the  most importantly, the gambling (i.e. taking excessive risk) via moral 
hazard should not be costless. That's why, Turkish Bankruptcy Law should be improved and 
                                                            
17 When this study is written.   24 
efficiently enforced. Following this, the implicit government guarantee schemes arising from 
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FIGURE: 1- AUCTION FORMATS 
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c. First-Price Sealed Bid Auction 
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d. Second-Price Sealed Bid Auction 
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TABLE:1- 7+( $:$5’,1* 0(7+2’ $1’ 7+( 180%(5 2) ￿* /ł&(16(6 
 








α   6  China
β  3 
Australia 
α  6  Estonia 
β  4 
Belgium
α  4  Finland
α  4 
Canada 
α  3  France 
α  4 
Czech Republic 
β  4  Iceland 
β  4 
Denmark 
β  4  Ireland 
β  4 
Germany 
α  6  Malaysia 
β  NA 
Greece 
α  4  Luxemburg 
β  4 
Hong Kong 
β  4-6  Norway 
α  4 
Indonesia
β  3-5  Portugal
α  4 
Italy
α  5  Slovakia
β  3 
Israel 
β  4  Spain
α  4 
Jamaica 
β  2  Sweden 
α  4 
New Zealand
α  3  South Korea
α  2-3 
Taiwan
β  5    
Singapore
α  4    
Poland 
β  5    
UK
α  5    
Switzerland
α  4    
Netherlands
α  5    
USA
β  NA    
TOTAL:21   TOTAL: 14   
α :12    α :7   




 β incomplete 
Source: Cellular News, and  UMTS, as of June 2001.   33 
 
TABLE: 2- CHARACTERISTICS OF DIFFERENT TYPES OF AUCTIONS 










demand falls to 
match the fixed 
amount at auction. 
It is important to 
note that bidders 
are able to reassess 
bids during the 
bidding process.    
Bidder's strategy is 
a function of (a) 
personal valuation, 
(b)prior assessment 
of rival valuations, 
and (c) new 
information 
obtained from the 
bidding process.  
Bidder's valuation of 
auctioned item(s) 
minus his or her 
highest bid.  
Payoff = (V1-b2) 
 V1=  Winning 
bidder's valuation. 
 b1= Winning bid 









demand rises to 
match the fixed 
amount at auction. 
Bidder's strategy is 
a function of (a) 
personal valuation, 
(b)prior assessment 
of rival valuations, 
and (c) no new 
information 
obtained from the 
bidding process. 
Bidder's valuation of 
auctioned item(s) 
minus his or her 
highest bid.  
Payoff = (V1-b2) 
 V1=  Winning 
bidder's valuation. 
 b1= Winning bid 
(running up bid +ε) 
First-Price Sealed-




Auction   
Bidders submit 
written bids in 
ignorance of all 
others. Highest 
bidder wins the 
item and pays the 
amount bid.   
Same as for Dutch 
auction above. 









written bids in 
ignorance of all 
others. Highest 
bidder wins the 
item and pays the 
amount of the 
second highest bid. 
Same as for Dutch 
auction above. 
Bidder's valuation of 
auctioned item(s) 
minus second highest 
bid  
Payoff = (V1-b2) 
 V1=  Winning 
bidder's valuation. 
 b2= Second highest 
bid 
 









   
TABLE:3- BIDS for GSM 1800 MHz LICENSE in TURKEY, US$ *   
   
1. Is Bankasi-Telecom Italia  2.525.000.000 
2. Dogan Holding-Dogus Holding-Sabanci Holding-Spain Telefonica  1.350.000.000 
3. Genpa-Atlas Yapi-Atlas Finans-Demirbank- Norway Telenor Mobile Communications  1.224.000.000 
4. Koc Holding-Medya Holding-SBC Communications  1.207.000.000 
5. Fiba Holding-Suzer Holding-Finansbank-Kentbank-French Telecom  1.017.000.000 
Mean (including 1)  1.464.600.000 
Mean (excluding 1)  1.199.500.000 
6.Reserve Price announced by  Ministry of Transportation  600.000.000 
7. Budget Revenue Estimation by Government  523.532.799 
* Figures do not include 17 per cent VAT   
Source: Press Release by Ministry of Transportation   
Budget revenue estimation is my own calculation.   
 
 
 